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Employment Law
Proving Racial and Gender Bias Under Title VII
Joan C. Williams1
Introduction
Law professors have proclaimed that implicit bias is the most
prominent form of bias today, and that Title VII is ill-equipped to
address it. Drawing on deep research in social science, this
Chapter shows that conceptualizing bias as unconscious or
implicit is not helpful in the legal context, and that Title VII is up
to the challenge of addressing bias.
Hundreds of experimental studies in the past forty years have
documented five basic patterns of racial and gender bias. The
Achilles’ heel in these studies, however, is that many experiments
occur in social-psychology labs. Do they describe what actually
goes on at work? My research shows that they do. The Workplace
Experiences Survey, which has now been taken by over 18,000
people in different industries, shows that the same five patterns of
racial and gender bias documented in experimental studies are
reported in workplaces. Once the focus shifts from the inner
workings of cognitive processing to what actually happens on the
ground, well-established legal theories under Title VII can be
applied in a straightforward way.
This Chapter describes the five basic patterns of bias and
argues that expert testimony should not be required to prove them
in court. Any reasonable jury will be able to recognize if they have
occurred because each pattern has been widely disseminated in
popular culture. Extensive examples are given.
The Chapter also explores the implications of Bostock v.
Clayton County2 for so-called “intersectional plaintiffs,” such as
women of color, who experience bias based on both race and
gender. Bostock loosened Title VII’s causation requirement,
holding that a plaintiff’s sex or race need not “be the sole or
1

Excerpted and adapted from Joan C. Williams, Rachel M. Korn & Sky
Mihaylo, Beyond Implicit Bias: Litigating Race and Gender Employment
Discrimination Using Data from the Workplace Experiences Survey, 72
HASTINGS L.J. 337 (2020).
2
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
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primary cause of an adverse employment action for Title VII
liability to follow.”3 This language, combined with data from the
Workplace Experiences Survey, provides a clear path for
analyzing Title VII cases involving women of color and other
intersectional plaintiffs. Bostock also provides important
precedent in cases involving discrimination against mothers.
Finally, the Chapter surveys forty years of social science to
provide important insight into two common employer defenses in
Title VII cases: the same-actor defense and the personal-animosity
defense. The same-actor defense posits that the same person who
hired the plaintiff would not then discriminate against them.
Social science shows why this assumption often is factually
incorrect. Social science also undermines the validity of the
personal-animosity defense—that an adverse employment action
stems not from bias but from personal dislike; in fact, prescriptive
bias is often expressed as dislike.
The Five Patterns of Racial and Gender Bias
The field of social psychology has literally hundreds of bias
studies that place people in workplace scenarios. In addition,
many social psychologists and behavioral economists have
conducted experiments in actual workplaces.4 These experiments
provide overwhelming evidence of five basic patterns of
workplace bias. The Workplace Experiences Survey shows that
workers report these same five patterns of bias occurring in their
actual workplaces today. The five basic patterns are these:
1. Prove It Again.5 In predominantly white workplaces,
people of color don’t seem a natural fit, so they often need to prove
3

Id. at 405.
E.g., Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is
There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOCIO. 1297, 1333 (2007);
John A. List & Andreas Leibbrandt, Do Women Avoid Salary
Negotiations? Evidence From a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment,
61 MGMT. SCI. 2016 (2014); Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, John F. Dovidio,
Victoria L. Brescoll, Mark J. Graham & Jo Handelsman, Science
Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 16474 (2012).
5
The technical names for the types of bias that feed the prove-it-again
effect include in-group favoritism, descriptive stereotyping, leniency
4
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themselves more than white people do. In workplaces where men
predominate in positions of power, women don’t seem as natural
a fit, so they need to prove themselves more than men do. Proveit-again bias has been documented repeatedly since at least the
1950s.6 Data from the Workplace Experiences Survey show that
prove-it-again bias is pervasive for both women and people of
color, and that women of color report it more often than any other
group.7 Prove-it-again bias shows up most commonly as follows:
•

•

•

Equally competent women or people of color are less
likely to be hired, less likely to be promoted, and
generally held to higher standards than their white male
peers; their work may be more scrutinized.
The mistakes of white men are treated more leniently (“it
could happen to anyone”) while mistakes made by women
and people of color are noticed more, remembered longer,
and prove costlier in terms of career trajectory.
The successes of white men are more likely to be noticed,
remembered longer, and attributed to stable internal
causes like skill, while the successes of women and
people of color are less likely to be noticed and more often
attributed to unstable external causes like luck.

bias, attribution bias, and confirmation bias. For a thorough review of
the literature on prove-it-again bias, see Williams et al., supra note 1.
6
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
7
See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS, SU LI, ROBERTA RINCON & PETER FINN,
CLIMATE CONTROL: GENDER AND RACIAL BIAS IN ENGINEERING? 112
(WorkLife Law 2016) (study of engineers); JOAN C. WILLIAMS,
KATHERINE W. PHILLIPS & ERIKA V. HALL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY? GENDER
BIAS AGAINST WOMEN IN SCIENCE 53 (WorkLife Law 2014) (study of
science professors); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, MARINA MULTHAUP, SU LI &
RACHEL KORN, YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE:
INTERRUPTING RACIAL & GENDER BIAS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (ABA
2018) (lawyers study); JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL KORN, THE
ELEPHANT IN THE (WELL-DESIGNED) ROOM: A STUDY OF GENDER AND
RACIAL BIAS IN THE PROFESSION OF ARCHITECTURE (forthcoming 2021)
(study of architects); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RACHEL M. KORN & RACHEL
MAAS, PINNING DOWN THE JELLYFISH: WOMEN OF COLOR IN TECH
(working paper studying tech).
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Women and people of color are much more likely than
white men to report that others get credit for ideas they
originally offered, a.k.a. “the stolen idea.”

2. Tightrope.8 Workplaces typically reward people who are
authoritative and ambitious, but women who behave that way
often are seen as difficult, abrasive, and not team player. Behavior
that would be seen as a mere quirk or a career-enhancing passion
for the business in a white man may be seen as angry if the
individual is Black, emotional if Hispanic, or sly and
untrustworthy if Asian. Asian-American women are most likely
to report backlash for authoritative behavior. Tightrope bias
commonly shows up in the following situations:
•

•

•

8

In hiring and performance evaluations, women and people
of color are more likely to be faulted for personality
problems than white men are. In some workplaces, people
of color do not thrive unless they are non-threatening and
well-liked, a.k.a. the teddy-bear effect, while white men’s
foibles and personalities are given broad rein.9
Anger and self-promotion are much more readily
accepted from white men than from any other group. So
is expertise: female experts may be disliked unless they
present their opinions in a warm and deferential way.10
Data from the Workplace Experiences Survey shows that
white men report, at extraordinarily high levels (between
80% and 90%), fair access to career-enhancing
assignments. Women and people of color are often
expected to be worker bees, not ambitious go-getters, and
report much lower rates of access to career-enhancing

The technical name for tightrope bias is prescriptive stereotyping. It has
been documented since the 1970s chiefly in the gender context, although
there are some studies on race, too. For a thorough review of the
literature on tightrope bias, see Williams et al., supra note 1.
9
Robert W. Livingston & Nicholas A. Pearce, The Teddy-Bear Effect:
Does Having a Baby Face Benefit Black Chief Executive Officers?, 20
PSYCH. SCI. 1229, 1232 (2009).
10
Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt & Katherine W. Phillips, When What You
Know Is Not Enough: Expertise and Gender Dynamics in Task Groups,
30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1585, 1594 (2004).
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assignments. Women of all races report doing much more
administrative work (planning parties, cleaning up the
cups, taking notes at a meeting, finding a time to meet,
sending the follow-up email), emotional work (being the
peacemaker), and undervalued work (making the
PowerPoint for someone else to present, doing the task
list for a litigator, coordinating signatures for a corporate
lawyer) than men do.11
Women and people of color are interrupted far more than
white men are and are given fewer speaking turns.

3. Maternal Wall.12 Bias against mothers is the strongest and
most pervasive form of gender discrimination. Maternal-wall bias
has been documented for nearly 20 years. Latinas and white
women are the most likely to report it. Maternal-wall bias
commonly shows up as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

11

Mothers are assumed to be no longer committed to their
jobs.
Mothers are not given career-enhancing work.
Mothers are assumed to be less capable at their jobs, e.g.,
“pregnancy brain.”
Mothers who are competent are disliked and held to
higher performance standards.
Fathers who play an active role in family care are treated
as no longer competent or committed; research shows that
this “flexibility stigma” is in fact a “femininity stigma”—
which means that it is sex discrimination.13

Linda Babcock, Maria P. Recalde, Lise Vesterlund & Laurie Weingart,
Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with
Low Promotability, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 714, 744 (2017).
12
For a thorough review of the literature on maternal-wall bias, see
Williams et al., supra note 1.
13
Laurie A. Rudman & Kris Mescher, Penalizing Men Who Request a
Family Leave: Is Flexibility Stigma a Femininity Stigma?, 69 J. SOC.
ISSUES 322, 329 (2013).
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4. Tug of War.14 Some bias against a group fuels conflicts
within it. Tug-of-war bias has been studied since for at least 15
years. Common examples of tug-of-war bias include the
following:
•
•

•
•

•

Women or people of color undercut each other for the one
“diversity slot.”
Women join the “boys club” and align with the men
against other women, or people of color align with white
colleagues against colleagues of their own group, in order
to be accepted by the majority.
Women or people of color do not advocate for others of
their group due to fear that it will look like favoritism.
Women or people of color hold members of their group to
higher standards due to fear that poor performance by
another member of their group will reflect poorly on
them.
Women professionals report that they have trouble getting
administrative staff to do for them the kind of things that
they readily do for men.

5. Racial Stereotypes. Some bias is specific to race:
•
•
•

14

Asians are seen as good at technical skills but not suited
to leadership.15
Latino/as are seen as “hot-blooded,” prone to theft or
violence, or lazy.16
Black people are seen as “intimidating” or “threatening”
and are treated with startling disrespect.17

For a thorough review of the literature on tug-of-war bias, see
Williams et al., supra note 1.
15
Lei Lai & Linda C. Babcock, Asian Americans and Workplace
Discrimination: The Interplay Between Sex of Evaluators and the
Perception of Social Skills, 34 J. ORG. BEHAV. 310, 312 (2013).
16
WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 7, at 208.
17
Ashleigh Shelby Rosette, Christy Zhou Koval, Anyi Ma & Robert
Livingston, Race Matters for Women Leaders: Intersectional Effects on
Agentic Deficiencies and Penalties, 27 LEADERSHIP Q. 429, 439 (2016).
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Title VII Applies to These Patterns.
These contemporary forms of racial and gender
discrimination fit into Title VII. Tightrope bias was the type of
bias at issue in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: a hard-driving
woman was seen as unqualified for partnership because she was
insufficiently feminine.18 Subsequent courts have followed suit.19
Stereotyping evidence typically relies on comparators
(similarly situated members of an unprotected group) and has been
used to establish tightrope bias,20 especially when women and
people of color have less access to desirable work assignments;21
to establish prove-it-again bias, when women and people of color
are presumed incompetent;22 and maternal-wall bias,23 although
the Supreme Court has clarified that discrimination against
mothers is straightforward sex discrimination.24 Stereotyping
evidence typically—but not necessarily—involves comments.25
Other evidence can be used to establish tug-of-war bias. For
example, Twymon v. Well Fargo involved a Black Director of
Employee Relations counseling another employee to develop a
deferential persona as a “good Black” who “would be accepted by

18

490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
Margolis v. Tektronix, Inc., 44 F. App’x 138, 141–42 (9th Cir. 2002);
Casella v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 2009 WL 1621411, at *14 n. 24 (D. Me.
2009); Collins v. Cohen Pontani Lieberman & Pavane, 2008 WL
2971668, at *10 n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Kahn v. Fairfield Univ., 357 F.
Supp. 2d 496, 498–99 (D. Conn. 2005).
20
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999);
Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 771 (E.D.
Wis. 2010).
21
EEOC v. Schott N. Am., Inc., 2009 WL 310897, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa.
2009); Collins, 2008 WL 2971668, at *10 n.24, *16.
22
Thomas, 183 F.3d at 59; Kimble, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
23
Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118
(2d Cir. 2004).
24
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1743 (2020).
25
E.g., EEOC v. Bob Evans Farms, 275 F. Supp. 3d 635, 640 (W.D. Pa.
2017) (awarding summary judgment to the plaintiff, despite the lack of
explicit statements, because the employer had given the pregnant
employee zero hours).
19
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the Caucasians at Wells Fargo.”26 The plaintiff responded by
asking if she should act like an Uncle Tom.27
Expert Testimony is Not Required to Establish Bias.
The Supreme Court, in Price Waterhouse, was careful to
signal that plaintiffs do not need expert testimony to introduce
evidence of stereotyping:
Indeed, we are tempted to say that Doctor Fiske’s expert
testimony was merely icing on Hopkins’ cake. It takes no
special training to discern sex stereotyping and a description of
an aggressive female employee as requiring “a course at charm
school.” Nor . . . Require expertise and psychology to note that,
if an employee’s flawed “interpersonal skills” can be corrected
by a soft hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the
employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn
the criticism.28

The same is true of all five patterns of bias. Each pattern has
been widely recognized in popular culture, such that any
reasonable jury can be expected to be able to recognize these
patterns without the need for expert testimony. Assessing whether
bias has occurred involves a series of judgments by the factfinder
as to whether the plaintiff has been treated differently than the
comparator, whether that treatment was because of sex/race or
because of something else, and whether comments involve
stereotyping.
Women of Color and Other “Intersectional Plaintiffs”
Women of color report high levels of prove-it-again bias,
tightrope bias, and tug-of-war bias. They often spend time trying
to figure out whether they are having to prove themselves over
and over again because they are women or because they are people
of color. Courts have sometimes struggled with cases involving

26

Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 936 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 931.
28
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256.
27
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women of color or other “intersectional plaintiffs” for fear of
creating an infinite regression of protected categories.29
Given that both racial and gender discrimination are illegal,
this angels-on-the-head-of-a-pin inquiry is unnecessary. Evidence
from the Workplace Experiences Survey shows that women of
color are often treated differently from both men of color and
white women. More to the point: the key comparator for women
of color should be white men.
The Same-Actor Inference
The “same-actor inference” stems from the 1991 Fourth
Circuit case of Proud v. Stone.30 Proud involved the firing of an
accountant, within 4½ months of the time he was hired, by the
supervisor who hired him; the court reasoned that it would seem
unlikely that the same person who hired the plaintiff would then
have discriminated against him shortly after.31 Subsequent cases
greatly expanded the doctrine. By 2008, the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits had held that the
same-actor inference was an almost-irrebuttable presumption,32
often leading courts to grant employers’ motions for summary
judgment even when people other than the discriminator had
played a role in the plaintiff’s hiring.33
This expanded same-actor inference suffers from several
fallacies. First, when the hiring decision is made by a group
different from the firing decision, no inference should lie. Second,
the same-actor inference ought to be per se inapplicable in cases
involving maternal-wall bias when the employee is hired prior to
having children. Third, the tug-of-war bias indicates that people
of color can take dramatically different approaches for

29

See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
30
945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991).
31
Id. at 797.
32
See Andrea L. Miller, The Use (and Misuse) of the Same-Actor
Inference in Family Responsibilities Discrimination Litigation: Lessons
from Social Psychology on Flexibility Stigma, 41 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1032, 1073 (2015).
33
Id. at 1066–67, 1070–71.
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assimilating, or refusing to assimilate, into the white majority.34 A
supervisor of color could hire other persons of color but then
discriminate against them because they are too deferential, or
undeferential, to the white majority. The same goes for women
and their relationship to the “boys club.”
The Personal-Animosity Defense
The personal-animosity defense is available when an adverse
employment action stems not from discrimination but from
personal animosity.35 As the data reveal, the problem with this
defense is that, often, personal animosity goes hand-in-hand with
unlawful discrimination. White men get a pass for behavior that,
for women, would be held against them as difficult, abrasive,
lacking in social skills or polish, etc. This is classic gender bias of
the type decried in the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse.
Similarly, tightrope bias means that people of color may be
criticized as difficult, out of control, or threatening for behavior
readily accepted in white men. In these situations, personal dislike
is an expression of unlawful bias.
Conclusion
Five common patterns of bias are pervasive in practice and
widely recognized in the social-science literature. Understanding
those patterns can lead to better application of the Title VII and
other antidiscrimination statutes in court.

34

Twymon, 462 F.3d at 936.
See Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity
Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1177 (2003); Ann C. McGinley, Viva La Evolucion!:
Recognizing Unconscious Motives in Title VII, CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 415 (2000).
35

